

Message Text

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ACTION EA-12

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 2535

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: CH, JA, PEPR
SUBJ: PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY NEGOTIATIONS: JAPANESE
EMBASSY COMMENTS

1. SUMMARY. SIGNING OF THE SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY ON AUGUST 12 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS AT KEY POINTS IN THE FINAL ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS. TENG HSIAO-PING HAD CLOSE CONTROL OVER THE PRC DELEGATION AND PROVIDED FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA WITH THE CHINESE POSITION ON THE FINAL WORDING OF THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE, ON TERMINATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE AND THE SENKAKUS ISSUE. TENG WILL GO TO TOKYO IN LATE OCTOBER FOR THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATION DOCUMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. JAPANESE EMBASSY MINISTER-COUNSELOR DONOWSKI HAS PROVIDED USLO WITH THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CLIMACTIC SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY. DONOWAKI HAS BEEN PERSONALLY IN CHARGE OF THE EMBASSY'S GROUNDWORK FOR THE TALKS SINCE 1975 AND HAS TWICE HAD HIS TOUR IN PEKING EXTENDED "FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS". ALTHOUGH HE HAD CONSISTENTLY BEEN MORE BULLISH ABOUT PROSPECTS

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FOR CONCLUSION OF THE PFT THAN OTHERS - MOST NOTABLY AFTER THE SENKAKUS INCIDENT IN APRIL - HIS CONFIDENCE HAS FINALLY BEEN BORNE OUT. DONOWAKI SAID THAT THE EMBASSY HAD NOT RECEIVED AUTHORIZATION TO DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATIONS IN DETAIL AND ASKED THAT HIS ACCOUNT BE HELD CLOSELY.

3. DONOWAKI SAID THAT AMBASSADOR SATO HAD OPENED THE CURRENT

ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PFT ON JULY 21 WITH A LONG EXPOSITION ON JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY. THIS INCLUDED THE BASIC SENTIMENT THAT JAPAN WISHED TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAN NIEN-LUNG HAD COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE COULD UNDERSTAND THE JAPANESE DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES THIS SEEMED TO BE MORE OF A SUBJECTIVE WISH THAN A POLICY STATEMENT AND CHINA DID NOT BELIEVE IT COULD EQUATE FOREIGN POLICY WITH SUBJECTIVE DESIRES. NEVERTHELESS, THE CHINESE SEEMED TO TAKE CAREFUL NOTE AND TO BE QUITE APPRECIATIVE OF THE OUTLINE GIVEN ON JAPANESE POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. CHINESE INTEREST APPEARED TO QUICKEN WHEN IN THE SECOND SESSION AMBASSADOR SATO STATED THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE IN THE SINO-JAPANESE COMMUNIQUE OF 1972 WAS "VERY IMPORTANT."

4. AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED INTO THE THIRD AND FOURTH SESSIONS, THE JAPANESE BEGAN TO REALIZE THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE ACTUALLY QUITE CLOSE ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. ALTHOUGH ASIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU DIRECTOR NAKAE HAD ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO RETURN TO TOKYO AT THIS POINT, A DECISION WAS MADE THAT HE SHOULD STAY ON AND THAT THE MOMENTUM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. AT THE FIFTH SESSION HAN AGREED TO A CHANGE OF TEXTS TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES WHICH COULD BE LINKED WITH THE ANTI-HEGEMONY STATEMENT. THE JAPANESE HAD NOT EXPECTED THIS BREAKTHROUGH AND IN THE

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NEXT SIX OR SEVEN MEETINGS THE TEMPO OF DISCUSSIONS QUICKENED AS THE TWO SIDES CONCENTRATED ON REACHING AGREED WORDING FOR THE TEXTS. NEGOTIATIONS WERE DIFFICULT, AND SOMETIMES HEATED, BUT THE CHINESE INSISTED THAT EVENTUAL AGREEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED. ALTHOUGH HAN ACCUSED SATO OF "CHANGING THE HOT WATER AND NOT THE MEDICINE" AS THE JAPANESE ADJUSTED WORDING, HE CONTINUED TO EMPHASIZE INCREASING AREAS OF AGREEMENT.

5. AT THIS POINT THE DELEGATION BELIEVED THAT THE TIME WAS RIGHT FOR FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA TO NAIL DOWN THE REMAINING PARTS OF AN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, SENIOR LDP CONSERVATIVES INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA AND CABINET SECRETARY ABE HAD VERY "STIFF IDEAS" ABOUT CONCLUSION OF THE PFT AND SONODA'S ROLE IN ITS CONCLUSION, ACCORDING TO DONOWAKI. THOSE WHO OPPOSED SONODA PREFERRED THAT AMBASSADOR SATO COMPLETE THE TREATY AND THAT SONODA GET MINIMUM CREDIT.

6. AFTER THE TWELFTH SESSION NAKAE RETURNED TO TOKYO ON AUGUST 5. ON THE 6TH HE CONSULTED WITH PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA AND OTHER TOP LEADERS ON HOW TO PROCEED. NEW JAPANESE PROPOSALS TO CONCLUDE THE TREATY, EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED BY

THE CHINESE, WERE DRAFTED AT THIS POINT. AFTER THESE CONSULTATIONS AT 9 P.M. ON THE EVENING OF AUGUST 6 FUKUDA DIRECTED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER GO TO PEKING. DONOWAKI WAS TOLD BY TELEPHONE FROM TOKYO TO REQUEST CHINESE APPROVAL FOR SONODA TO COME AND INFORM THEM THAT AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE SECURED WITHIN THE NEXT HOUR IN ORDER TO MEET JAPANESE NEWSPAPER DEADLINES. DONOWAKI CALLED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WAS TOLD WITHIN A HALF AN HOUR THAT THE GOJ COULD PROCEED WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SONODA WAS COMING. TIEN MING, THE MFA JAPANESE AFFAIRS DIRECTOR, SAID THAT TENG HSIAO-PING HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED THIS DECISION.

7. JAPANESE LEADERS, AND FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA IN PARTICULAR, REGARDED CHANG HSIANG-SHAN'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 5

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REGARDING COMPROMISE WORDING ON THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE AS AN UNACCEPTABLE INTRUSION INTO JAPANESE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. DONOWAKI COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS A TYPICAL MANEUVER BY FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION LEADERS WHO FOR YEARS HAD TRIED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE JAPANESE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WITH PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS AND OPEN SESSIONS WITH VISITING DIET MEMBERS. SONODA WAS PARTICULARLY PUT OUT SINCE IT MADE IT APPEAR, PERHAPS CORRECTLY, THAT THERE WAS LITTLE LEFT FOR HIM TO NEGOTIATE.

8. IN HIS FIRST SESSION WITH HUANG HUA, SONODA ATTEMPTED TO GIVE A HIGH LEVEL PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND A GENERAL RESUME OF JAPANESE VIEWS ON THE PFT INCLUDING THE IDEA THAT THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE SHOULD BE WORDED SO AS TO REASSURE ASIAN COUNTRIES WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE HEGEMONY. HE ALSO TOOK A HARD LINE ON PAST CHINESE CRITICISM OF JAPANESE LEADERS, ASKING HOW THE PRC WOULD RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON TENG HSIAO-PING AND HUA KUO-FENG. HUANG HUA REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO NARROW THE DISCUSSION TO THE WORDING OF THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE. THE SECOND SESSION THAT DAY, ORIGINALLY SET FOR 3 O'CLOCK, WAS DELAYED UNTIL 4 BY LAST MINUTE

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CHINESE REQUEST. HUANG HUA FINALLY ARRIVED AT 4:20 AND IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT CHINA ACCEPTED THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THE CLAUSE. IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE NEGOTIATIONS, HUANG PROPOSED THAT THE OTHER CLAUSES OF THE PFT BE ADDRESSED BY AMBASSADOR SATO AND HAN NIEN-LUNG SEPARATELY.

9. THE CHINESE HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE INITIALED IN PEKING BY SONODA AND LATER SIGNED IN TOKYO BY A CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE, PRESUMABLY TENG. SONODA, HOWEVER, ON HIS ARRIVAL TOLD TENG THAT THE JAPANESE WERE WILLING TO PROCEED WITH SIGNING OF THE TREATY IN PEKING. DONOWAKI THOUGHT THAT THIS MAY HAVE HELPED SPEED THE FINAL COMPROMISES. TENG WILL STILL TRAVEL TO TOKYO IN THE LATTER PART OF OCTOBER FOR THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATION DOCUMENTS.

10. DONOWAKI SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IT HAD SEEMED THAT HUA KUO-FENG HAD FOLLOWED THE DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS RATHER CLOSELY -- HE KNEW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NATURE OF NAKAE'S TRAVELS BACK AND FORTH FROM TOKYO -- ACTUAL DECISIONS SEEMED TO BE IN THE HANDS OF TENG. THE CHINESE DELEGATION LEFT IT QUITE CLEAR THAT TENG WAS IN CHARGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. IT WAS TENG WHO RAISED THE CHINESE POSITION ON THE SINO-
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SOVIET ALLIANCE. HE TOLD SONODA THAT INsofar AS THE CHINESE ARE CONCERNED "THE TREATY DOES NOT EXIST" BUT AS LONG AS IT CONTAINED LANGUAGE FOR ITS TERMINATION, THE PRC WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO END IT. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, DID NOT WISH TO GIVE THE TREATY UNDUE IMPORTANCE. NCNA WOULD BE AUTHORIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN APRIL OF 1979 TO SAY THAT THE TREATY WOULD TERMINATE. THE JAPANESE WERE NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS WOULD BE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO ABROGATE THE TREATY AND IN THE 16TH SESSION BROUGHT THE ISSUE UP AGAIN, QUESTIONING THE LEGAL EFFECT THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY NCNA MIGHT HAVE. THE CHINESE PRODUCED THE RUSSIAN AND

CHINESE LANGUAGE TEXTS OF THE TREATY AND SHOWED THAT THIS WOULD INDEED BE SUFFICIENT NOTIFICATION. THE JAPANESE WERE SURPRISED; THEIR INFORMAL JAPANESE TRANSLATION SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT A MORE STRUCTURED ABROGATION WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE.

12. AS HAD BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS, TENG PROVIDED SOME ASSURANCE THAT THE SENKAKUS INCIDENT WOULD NOT RECUR.

13. THE CHINESE HAD ORIGINALLY INCLUDED LANGUAGE IN THEIR PROPOSED TEXT FOR THE TREATY REGARDING REGULAR MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS. THE JAPANESE HAD BEEN OPPOSED, STATING THAT SUCH LANGUAGE WOULD MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE TREATY CONSTITUTED A FORM OF ALLIANCE. MEANWHILE, CONSULTATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE WITHOUT ANY FORMAL BASIS IN THE TREATY. HUANG HUA AND SONODA SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED ON ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS.

14. THE JAPANESE RAISED THEIR DESIRE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSULATE IN CANTON AND CONSTRUCTION OF A RESIDENCE FOR THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN SHANGHAI. THE CHINESE STATED THAT "THIS CAN BE STUDIED."

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15. DONOWAKI SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SONODA HAD RAISED WITH HUANG HUA THE POSSIBILITY OF PRC SUPPORT FOR JAPAN'S BID FOR A PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT. HUANG HUA SAID THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER SUCH SUPPORT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES.

16. IN REVIEWING THE COURSE OF THE FINAL ROUND OF TALKS, DONOWAKI SAID THAT HE COULD ONLY SPECULATE ON THE REASONS FOR CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE AT KEY JUNCTURES ON MATTERS WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN UNALTERABLE PRINCIPLES. THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY HAD BEEN MOTIVATED BY INCREASED FEAR OF THE USSR. NEW URGENCY COULD HAVE BEEN LENT TO CONCLUSION OF THE PFT BY CHINESE DESIRE TO REMOVE OBSTACLES TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE NON-COMMUNIST DEVELOPED WORLD. TENG HSIAO-PING'S EVIDENT AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN POLICY MIGHT HAVE BROUGHT A MORE PRACTICAL WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS AND MORE IMPATIENCE TO COMPLETE THEM. FINALLY, JAPANESE RESILIENCE AND TOUGHNESS AT CERTAIN IMPORTANT POINTS MIGHT HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO DONOWAKI. WOODCOCK

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Message Attributes

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